History of scientific ideas — Story, Setting & Ideas

ITHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY.

_Sect._ 1.--_Thoughts and Things._

IN order that we may do something towards determining the nature and conditions of human knowledge, (which I have already stated as the purpose of this work,) I shall have to refer to an antithesis or opposition, which is familiar and generally recognized, and in which the distinction of the things opposed to each other is commonly considered very clear and plain. I shall have to attempt to make this opposition sharper and stronger than it is usually conceived, and yet to shew that the distinction is far from being so clear and definite as it is usually assumed to be: I shall have to point the contrast, yet shew that the things which are contrasted cannot be separated:--I must explain that the antithesis is constant and essential, but yet that there is no fixed and permanent line dividing its members. I may thus appear, in different parts of my discussion, to be proceeding in opposite directions, but I hope that the reader who gives me a patient attention will see that both steps lead to the point of view to which I wish to lead him.

The antithesis or opposition of which I speak is denoted, with various modifications, by various pairs of terms: I shall endeavour to shew the connexion of these different modes of expression, and I will begin with that form which is the simplest and most idiomatic. {24}

The simplest and most idiomatic expression of the antithesis to which I refer is that in which we oppose to each other THINGS and THOUGHTS. The opposition is familiar and plain. Our thoughts are something which belongs to ourselves; something which takes place within us; they are what we think; they are actions of our minds. Things, on the contrary, are something different from ourselves and independent of us; something which is without us; they _are_; we see them, touch them, and thus know that they exist; but we do not make them by seeing or touching them, as we make our _Thoughts_ by thinking them; we are passive, and _Things_ act upon our organs of perception.

Now what I wish especially to remark is this: that in all human KNOWLEDGE both Thoughts and Things are concerned. In every part of my knowledge there must be some _thing_ about which I know, and an internal act of _me_ who know. Thus, to take simple yet definite parts of our knowledge, if I know that a solar year consists of 365 days, or a lunar month of 30 days, I know something about the sun or the moon; namely, that those objects perform certain revolutions and go through certain changes, in those numbers of days; but I count such numbers and conceive such revolutions and changes by acts of my own thoughts. And both these elements of my knowledge are indispensable. If there were not such external Things as the sun and the moon I could not have any knowledge of the progress of time as marked by them. And however regular were the motions of the sun and moon, if I could not count their appearances and combine their changes into a cycle, or if I could not understand this when done by other men, I could not know anything about a year or a month. In the former case I might be conceived as a human being, possessing the human powers of thinking and reckoning, but kept in a dark world with nothing to mark the progress of existence. The latter is the case of brute animals, which see the sun and moon, but do not know how many days make a month or a year, because they have not human powers of thinking and reckoning. {25}

The two elements which are essential to our knowledge in the above cases, are necessary to human knowledge in all cases. In all cases, Knowledge implies a combination of Thoughts and Things. Without this combination, it would not be Knowledge. Without Thoughts, there could be no connexion; without Things, there could be no reality. Thoughts and Things are so intimately combined in our Knowledge, that we do not look upon them as distinct. One single act of the mind involves them both; and their contrast disappears in their union.

But though Knowledge requires the union of these two elements, Philosophy requires the separation of them, in order that the nature and structure of Knowledge may be seen. Therefore I begin by considering this separation. And I now proceed to speak of another way of looking at the antithesis of which I have spoken; and which I may, for the reasons which I have just mentioned, call the FUNDAMENTAL ANTITHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY.

_Sect._ 2.--_Necessary and Experiential Truths._