Spencer's Philosophy of Science The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered at the Museum 7 November, 1913 — Reading Companion

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Authors: Morgan, C. Lloyd (Conwy Lloyd), 1852-1936 Digital Source: Project Gutenberg Gutenberg Release Year: 2011 First Publication Year: Not confirmed

Key Word: Science -- Philosophy; Spencer, Herbert, 1820-1903 Target Reader: Readers of public-domain and historical texts

Book Edition: Project Gutenberg digital edition Book Language: en

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Words 19,168

Reading time 84 min

Text sections 3

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Source: Project Gutenberg record #37513

C. Lloyd Morgan's 1913 Herbert Spencer Lecture examines Spencer's philosophy of science through the lens of structure, recurring images, and movement between scenes, focusing on the shift from mechanical to emergent interpretations.

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Such was my introduction to Herbert Spencer, some of whose works I read with admiration during the next few years.

I have no very distinct recollection of the impression produced on my mind by the germinal essay of 1857, save that it served to quicken that craving, which is, I suppose, characteristic of those who have some natural bent towards philosophy--the imperative craving to seek and, if it may be, to find the one in the many. In any case Tyndall's suggestive sentence was here amplified and the underlying law was disclosed.

'Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufacture, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, the same evolution of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilisation, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which Progress essentially consists.'[2]

Here was just what I wanted--on the one hand the whole wide universe of existence; and on the other hand a brief formula with which to label its potted essence. How breathlessly one was led on, with only such breaches of continuity as separate paragraphs inevitably impose, right away from the primitive fire-mist to one of Bach's fugues or the critical doctrines of Mr. Ruskin, guided throughout by the magic of differentiation. What if the modes of existence, dealt with in successive sections, were somewhat startlingly diverse! Was not this itself a supreme example of the evolution of that diversity which the formula enables us to interpret? For if there were a passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, the more heterogeneous the products--inorganic, organic, and superorganic, as I learnt to call them--the stronger the evidence for the law. Only by shutting one's eyes to the light that had been shed on the world by evolution could one fail to see how simple and yet how inevitable was the whole business.

If then differentiation be the cardinal law of evolution--for the correlative concept of integration receives no emphasis in this early essay--does not the universality of the law imply a universal cause? Just as gravitation was assignable as a _cause_ of each of the groups of phenomena which Kepler formulated; so might some equally simple attribute of things be assignable as the cause of each of the groups of phenomena formulated in terms of differentiation. Now the only obvious respect in which all kinds of Progress are alike, is, that they are modes of change; and hence in some characteristic of changes in general, the desired solution must be found. Thus we are led up to the statement of the all-pervading principle which determines the all-pervading process of differentiation. It is this: _Every active force produces more than one change--every cause produces more than one effect._[3]

In the first part of the Essay many and varied facts are adduced to show that every kind of progress is from the simple to the complex. The aim of the second part is to show why this is so: it is 'because each change is followed by many changes'. From the beginning, the decomposition of every expended force into several forces has been perpetually producing a higher complication, and thus Progress is not an accident but a beneficent necessity. In a brief third part we are bidden to remember that

'after all that has been said the ultimate mystery remains just as it was. The explanation of that which is explicable does but bring out into greater clearness the inexplicableness of that which remains behind.... The sincere man of science, content to follow wherever the evidence leads him becomes by each new enquiry more profoundly convinced that the Universe is an insoluble problem.... In all directions his investigations bring him face to face with the unknowable; and he ever more clearly perceives it to be the unknowable'.[4]

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C. Lloyd Morgan opens his 1913 Herbert Spencer Lecture with a personal recollection: reading Tyndall's Scientific Use of the Imagination in 1870, which fired his youthful enthusiasm. He quotes Tyndall's claim that the human mind was once 'latent in a fiery cloud,' then recounts a friend's caustic reply invoking Carlyle's Sartor Resartus and a 'Philosophy of Clothes.' This anecdote establishes a recurring image—the stripping of nature to its barest elements—and a structural pattern: Morgan moves between vivid scenes of intellectual awakening and critical analysis of Spencer's system.

The Nebular Hypothesis as a Recurring Image

Morgan returns several times to the image of a 'fiery cloud' as the origin of all things, a figure borrowed from Tyndall and the nebular hypothesis. In the opening anecdote, the phrase 'latent in a fiery cloud' is presented as a bold reduction of evolution. Later, Morgan uses the cloud image to test Spencer's commitment to mechanical explanation. He notes that Spencer, in his Biology, originally claimed that compound properties are mere 'resultants' of components, with no emergent novelty. The fiery cloud thus becomes a touchstone: does Spencer allow anything genuinely new to arise from the primordial haze, or is everything already contained? Morgan's analysis shows that Spencer's later addition of a 'Dynamic Element in Life' chapter partially concedes that living processes cannot be fully described in physico-chemical terms—a shift that Morgan calls a 'tardy recognition.' The cloud image, then, is not just a rhetorical flourish but a structural device to track Spencer's evolving position.

Movement Between Personal Scene and Philosophical Critique

The lecture moves fluidly between autobiographical scenes and abstract argument. Morgan begins with a specific moment: quoting Tyndall to an older friend, whose skeptical reply prompts him to reconsider. This scene is not merely decorative; it establishes a pattern of testing grand claims against careful analysis. Later, Morgan shifts to a discussion of Spencer's First Principles and the 'persistence of force,' but he repeatedly returns to the concrete image of the 'fiery cloud' to ground the abstraction. The movement is not linear but oscillatory: from personal memory to philosophical principle, back to a critical question about Spencer's consistency. This structure mirrors Morgan's own method—he does not simply expound Spencer but enacts a dialogue between youthful enthusiasm and mature scrutiny. The reader is invited to follow this back-and-forth, watching as Morgan weighs Spencer's claims against the evidence of later editions.

The Cognitive Relation and the Limits of Knowledge

In the final section of the excerpt, Morgan turns to Spencer's 'transfigured realism' and the role of the cognitive relation. He quotes Spencer's claim that 'our states of consciousness are the only things we can know,' but immediately warns that this is 'a terribly ambiguous way of expressing the fact.' Morgan's critique is precise: he distinguishes between the truism that knowledge involves a knower and the stronger conclusion that the objective world cannot be known as it is in itself. He notes that for Spencer, the world as symbolized is 'the real world for science,' but he questions whether the arguments for this conclusion are valid. This section is notable for its careful parsing of Spencer's language—Morgan does not dismiss the position but examines its logical structure. The movement here is from Spencer's text to Morgan's interrogation, with no reliance on external authority. The result is a focused analysis of how Spencer's epistemology shapes his philosophy of science.

Spencer's Shift on Emergence and Mechanical Interpretation

Morgan identifies a crucial departure in Spencer's thought: the insertion of a chapter on the 'Dynamic Element in Life' in the last edition of Biology. He quotes Spencer's admission that 'Life in its essence cannot be conceived in physico-chemical terms,' and then asks pointedly: 'did Spencer fully realize how big a hole this knocks in the bottom of the purely mechanical interpretation of nature he had for so long championed?' This question is the lecture's central structural pivot. Morgan traces the shift from an earlier position where compound properties were mere 'resultants' to a later recognition of specific vital characters. He does not claim that Spencer abandoned mechanism entirely—Spencer still traces life down to the 'Unknowable'—but he highlights the tension between the two positions. The movement between editions becomes a scene of intellectual drama: the older Spencer revising his own work, the younger Morgan weighing the consequences. This section exemplifies Morgan's method of using textual evidence to reveal underlying philosophical shifts.

Morgan's lecture is best read as a dialogue between two versions of Spencer: the confident systematizer of First Principles and the more cautious reviser of later editions. The recurring image of the 'fiery cloud' and the movement between personal anecdote and textual analysis give the lecture a distinctive rhythm. Readers should attend to Morgan's use of Spencer's own words—especially the quoted passages—as evidence for the shifts he describes. The lecture does not attempt a comprehensive survey but instead focuses on key moments of tension, making it a valuable companion to Spencer's original works.

That November afternoon, the rain streaked the window as I followed Lloyd Morgan’s careful unravelling of Spencer’s mechanical universe into something more fluid, almost alive. The shift felt less like argument, more like exhaling. Afterwards, restless, I found myself reaching for the old Stoic’s quiet insistence on what lies within our power — a gentler echo of the same turning inward. The Teaching of Epictetus Being the 'Encheiridion of Epictetus,' with Selections from the 'Dissertations' and 'Fragments' — Reading Notes sat close, and the connection felt almost accidental.