Democritus Platonissans — Inside the Classic

e had looked at him only to find his own reflection.

But there was nothing really new about the idea of infinite worlds which More described in _Democritus Platonissans_; it surely was not a conception unique to Descartes. The theory was a common one in Greek and Renaissance thought. Democritus and the Epicureans, of course, advocated the theme of infinite worlds in an infinite universe which More accepted; but at the same time, he rejected their view of a mechanistic and fortuitous creation. Although Plato specifically rejects the idea of infinite worlds (in _Timaeus_), More imagines, as the title of his poem implies, a Platonic universe, by which he really means neo-Platonic, combined with a Democritean plurality of worlds. More filled space, not with the infinite void of the Atomists, but with the Divine, ever active immanence. More, in fact, in an early philosophic work, _An Antidote against Atheisme_ (1652), and again in _Divine Dialogues_ (1668), refutes Lucretius by asserting the usefulness of all created things in God’s Providence and the essential design in Nature. His reference in _Democritus Platonissans_ (st. 20) is typical: “though I detest the sect/ of Epicurus for their manners vile,/ Yet what is true I may not well reject.” In bringing together Democritus’ theories and neo-Platonic thought, More obviously has attempted reconciliation of two exclusive world views, but with dubious success.

While More stands firmly before a familiar tradition, his belief in an infinity of worlds evidently has little immediate connection with any predecessors. Even Bruno’s work, or Thomas Digges,’ which could have occupied an important place, seems to have had little, if any, direct influence on More. It was Descartes who stimulated his thought at the most receptive moment: in 1642 to have denied a theory which in 1646 he proclaimed with such force evidently argues in favor of a most powerful attachment. More responded enthusiastically to what he deemed a congenial metaphysical system; as a champion of Descartes, he was first to make him known in England and first in England to praise the infinity of worlds, yet Descartes’ system could give to him little real solace. More embraces God’s plenitude and infinity of worlds, he rejoices in the variety and grandeur of the universe, and he worships it as he might God Himself; but Descartes was fundamentally uninterested in such enthusiasms and found them even repellant--as well as unnecessary--to his thought. For More the doctrine of infinity was a proper corollary of Copernican astronomy and neo-Platonism (as well as Cabbalistic mysticism) and therefore a necessity to his whole elaborate and eclectic view of the world.

In introducing Cartesian thought into England, More emphasized particular physical doctrines mainly described in _The Principles of Philosophy_; he shows little interest in the _Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason_ (1637), or in the _Meditations_ (1641), both of which were also available to him when he wrote _Democritus Platonissans_. In the preface to his poem, he refers to Descartes whom he seems to have read hopefully: surely “infinitude” is the same as the Cartesian “indefinite.” “_For what is his =mundus indefinitè extensus=, but =extensus infinitè=? Else it sounds onely =infinitus quoad nos=, but =simpliciter finitus=_,” for there can be no space “_unstuffd with Atoms_.” More thinks that Descartes seems “to mince it,” that difficulty lies in the interpretation of a word, not in an essential idea. He is referring to Part II, xxi, of _The Principles_, but he quotes, with tacit approval, from Part III, i and ii, in the motto to the poem. More undoubtedly knows the specific discussion of ‘infinity’ in Part I, xxvi-xxviii, where he must first have felt uneasy delight on reading “that it is not needful to enter into disputes regarding the infinite, but merely to hold all that in which we can find no limits as indefinite, such as the extension of the world . . . .”[4] More asked Descartes to clarify his language in their correspondence of 1648-49, the last year of Descartes’ life.

_Democritus Platonissans_ is More’s earliest statement about absolute space and time; by introducing these themes into English philosophy, he contributed significantly to the intellectual history of the seventeenth century. Newton, indeed, was able to make use of More’s forging efforts; but of relative time or space and their measurement, which so much concerned Newton, More had little to say. He was preoccupied with the development of a theory which would show that immaterial substance, with space and time as attributes, is as real and as absolute as the Cartesian geometrical and spatial account of matter which he felt was true but much in need of amplification.